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With this distinction in hand, consider Landman et al.’s
conclusion:
The present data agree with the presence of two parallel types of short
term memory. . . . Almost all items enter the first type of memory. It is
like iconic memory, because it has a high capacity and it is maskable. . . .
The second type of memory is one that resists interference by new
stimuli. When new items enter the visual system, they replace the
old items, except the ones that have entered the second type of rep-
resentation. . . . The cue-advantage arises because the subjects selec-
tively transfer the cued item from iconic memory to the more
durable working memory. . . . (Landman et al. 2003, p.162)
Landman et al. are, then, concerned with informational persist-
ence, not visible persistence. Their paper contains no data con-
cerning visible persistence. Since informational persistence is
consistent with no visible persistence at all, Block’s appeal to
Landman et al. must be somewhat indirect.
And indeed it is. Block’s argument for visible persistence is
based on subjects’ reports: “[subjects say they are] continuing
to maintain a visual representation of the whole array” (sect. 9,
para. 6).
We have three points about this. First, Block needs only the
weaker claim that the subjects in the Landman et al. experiment
saw each rectangle as oriented horizontally or vertically, not the
stronger claim that the subjects remain in this state after the
stimulus has been replaced. The weaker claim implies Block’s
conclusion about inaccessibility for the same reason that the
stronger one does.
We do not dispute that information about the orientation of
each rectangle persists and is not as a whole accessible; we do
dispute Block’s claim that this inaccessible information charac-
terizes what the subjects see. Our second point is that it is
unclear that subjects’ reports unequivocally support Block.
Block needs subjects to agree that they saw each rectangle as
oriented horizontally or vertically (even if they can’t report
which orientation each rectangle has). More precisely: for each
rectangle x, either they saw x as horizontal, or they saw x as ver-
tical. If the subjects merely say that they saw eight rectangles,
some horizontal and some vertical, or that “they can see all or
almost all the 8 to 12 items in the presented arrays” (sect. 9,
para. 11), this is insufficient.
According to Landman et al., selected stimulus information is
transferred from the transient iconic memory to the more
durable working memory. Working memory therefore contains
less information about the stimulus than iconic memory. If that
is all that working memory contains, and if working memory
governs subjects’ reports about what they see (as Block sup-
poses), then subjects would simply say that they saw a circle of
rectangles and saw some of them as oriented horizontally/verti-
cally. They would not, then, agree that they saw details, some
of which they can’t report. So our third point is this: Block
must deny that the contents of working memory are simply a
subset of the contents of iconic memory, which is to go beyond
the results of Landman et al. If Block is right and subjects
report (correctly) that they saw each rectangle as oriented hori-
zontally or vertically, then the contents of working memory
should include, not just certain information about the stimulus
transferred from iconic memory, but also the meta-information
that some information was not transferred. We are not saying
that this proposal about the contents of working memory is
wrong, but only that the Landman experiment does not
address it.
NOTE
1. The question of the exact relationship between visible and informa-
tional persistence remains open. Loftus and Irwin (1998) argue that the
many measures of visible and informational persistence pick out the
same underlying process. Nevertheless, the distinction is still useful
and our discussion does not rely on the assumption that it marks a real
difference.
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Abstract: Can we really make sense of the idea (implied by Block’s
treatment) that there can be isolated islets of experience that are not
even potentially available as fodder for a creature’s conscious choices and
decisions? The links between experience and the availability of
information to guide conscious choice and inform reasoned action may
be deeper than the considerations concerning (mere) reportability suggest.
In this elegant and tightly argued target article, Ned Block seeks
to persuade us that phenomenal consciousness routinely “over-
flows” cognitive accessibility. By this he means that we can
(and do) have experiences even in cases where we lack the
kind of access that would yield some form of report that such
and such an experience had occurred. The case Block makes
for such an apparently hard-to-support judgment rests on a
“mesh” between psychological results and work in neuroscience.
The psychological data seem to show that subjects can see much
more than working memory enables them to report. Thus, in the
Landman et al. (2003) experiments, for instance, subjects show
a capacity to identify the orientation of only four rectangles
from a group of eight. Yet they typically report having seen the
specific orientation of all eight rectangles. Working memory
here seems to set a limit on the number of items available for con-
ceptualization and hence report.
Work in neuroscience then suggests that unattended represen-
tations, forming parts of strong-but-still-losing clusters of acti-
vation in the back of the head, can be almost as strong as the
clusters that win, are attended, and hence get to trigger the
kinds of frontal activity involved in general broadcasting (broad-
casting to the “global workspace”). But whereas Dehaene et al.
(2006) treat the contents of such close-seconds as preconscious,
because even in principle (given their de facto isolation from
winning frontal coalitions) they are unreportable, Block urges
us to treat them as phenomenally conscious, arguing that “the
claim that they are not conscious on the sole ground of unreport-
ability simply assumes metaphysical correlationism” (sect. 14,
para. 9; italics in original). That is to say, it simply assumes
what Block seeks to question – that is, that the kind of functional
poise that grounds actual or potential report is part of what con-
stitutes phenomenology. Contrary to this way of thinking, Block
argues that by treating the just-losing coalitions as supporting
phenomenally conscious (but in principle unreportable) experi-
ences, we explain the psychological results in a way that
meshes with the neuroscience.
The argument from mesh (which is a form of inference to the
best explanation) thus takes as its starting point the assertion that
the only grounds we have for treating the just-losing back-of-the-
head coalitions as non-conscious is the unreportability of the
putative experiences. But this strikes us as false, or at least pre-
mature. For underlying the appeal to reportability is, we
suspect, a deeper and perhaps more compelling access-oriented
concern. It is the concern that any putative conscious experience
should be the experience of an agent. The thought here is that we
cannot make sense of the image of free-floating experiences, of
little isolated islets of experience that are not even potentially
available as fodder for a creatures rational choices and con-
sidered actions. Evans (1982) rather famously rejects the very
idea of such informationally isolated islands of experience.
According to Evans, an informational state may underpin a con-
scious experience only if it (the informational state) is in some
sense input to a reasoning subject. To count as a conscious
experience an informational state must:
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[serve] as the input to a thinking, concept-applying and reasoning
system: so that the subject’s thoughts, plans, and deliberations are
also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the
input. When there is such a link we can say that the person, rather
than some part of his or her brain, receives and processes the infor-
mation. (Evans 1982, p.158)
The real point here is (or should be) independent of Evan’s
appeal to conceptualization. What matters, rather, is that the
information must be available to the agent qua “reasoning
subject,” where this may be unpacked in many different ways,
not all of them requiring full-blown concept-use on the part of
the agent (see, e.g., Bermu´dez & Macpherson 1998; Hurley
1997). Evans’ insight is that the notions of conscious experience
and reasoned agency (here very broadly construed) are deeply
intertwined: that there are non-negotiable links between what is
given in conscious awareness and the enabled sweep of deliberate
actions and choices available to a reasoning subject. Such a story
opens up a different way of interpreting the Sperling (1960) and
the Landman et al. (2003) results. In these cases (we suggest) sub-
jects report phenomenally registering all the items because infor-
mation concerning each item was, at that moment, available to be
deployed in the service of deliberate, reasoned, goal-directed
action. Such momentary potentiality is not undermined by the
(interesting and important) fact that the selection of a few items
to actually play that role then precludes the selection of the rest.
Contrariwise, Block argues that a subject like G.K. can be
having an experience of a face and yet it be impossible for him
to know anything of this experience. Block takes G.K.’s phenom-
enal experience to be constituted by recurrent processing in the
fusiform face area. We believe that G.K. can be consciously
experiencing a face only if this experience is at least momentarily
poised for use in reasoning, planning, and the deliberate selec-
tion of types of action. Recurrent processing in the fusiform
area will no doubt prove to be among the conditions necessary
for realizing a state that plays this causal role.
The contents of conscious phenomenal experience, if all this is
on track, must be at least potentially available for use in the plan-
ning and selection of deliberate, stored-knowledge–exploiting,
and goal-reflecting and goal-responsive, actions. Block’s just-
losing coalitions fail to trigger winning frontal coalitions and
hence fail to be in a position to contribute their contents in this
manner to the full sweep of the agent’s deliberate acts and
choices. It is this fact (rather than the more superficial indicator
of unreportability) that should motivate our treating the contents
of the just-losing coalitions as non-conscious. If this is correct,
then the staging post for the argument from mesh is called into
question. Until the considerations concerning links between
experience and rational agency are more fully addressed, it
remains unclear whether the kind of “fit” to which Block
appeals can really favor his conclusion over our own.
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Abstract: Block argues for a method and a substantive thesis – that
consciousness overflows accessibility. The method can help answer the
question of what it is like to be a baby. Substantively, infant consciousness
may be accessible in some ways but not others. But development itself
can also add important methodological tools and substantive insights to
the study of consciousness.
Infants and young children cannot report their phenomenology.
This has led some philosophers to argue that babies’ conscious-
ness must be limited. Even if we think that babies are conscious
it might seem impossible to recover the particular character of
their experience. A version of Block’s abductive method can at
least partially solve this problem. We can consider a wide range
of functional and neural correlates of conscious experience in
adults and then look to see similarities and differences in babies.
In adults attention is highly correlated with vivid conscious-
ness. This consciousness has a particular subjective qual-
ity – “the spotlight” – with a defined – “brightly lit” – focus
and surrounding darkness. Both phenomenologically and func-
tionally, attention to one event seems to inhibit consciousness
of other events – as in inattentional blindness.
There is a distinction between exogenous and endogenous atten-
tion. Exogenous attention is driven by information-rich external
events. These events may be intrinsically salient. But exogenous
attention may also be driven by subtle unexpectedness. Exogenous
attention is marked by characteristic event-related potential (ERP)
signatures, eye movements, decelerating heart rate, and parietal
activation. Exogenous attention and vivid consciousness character-
istically fade as information is obtained, a process of habituation.
Endogenous attention is the sort of top-down “paying attention”
that is motivated by specific goals rather than by intrinsic interest.
It has been the focus of the adult literature for methodological
reasons, and endogenous and exogenous attention are often not
distinguished in discussions of consciousness. Frontal activation
seems to be particularly important for endogenous attention.
These functional features of attention correlate well with neuro-
logical patterns. In adult animals, endogenous attention leads to
the release of cholinergic transmitters to some parts of the brain
and inhibitory transmitters to other parts. Attention increases
both the efficiency of a particular part of the brain and its plasticity;
and it inhibits activation and plasticity in other brain areas.
So for adults there is an elegant if undoubtedly oversimplified
story about how consciousness works. In the canonical case, the
goal-directed control systems in frontal cortex indicate that a par-
ticular kind of event is important. The perceptual system, guided
by attention, zooms in on just that event and the brain extracts infor-
mation about the event and modifies itself, that is, learns accord-
ingly. Significantly, though, this whole process is highly focused;
other parts of the brain may actually be shut down in the process.
Vivid spotlight consciousness is the phenomenological result.
Even very young infants have extensive exogenous attention
capacities. When they are presented with even highly subtle
and conceptually unexpected novel events, they immediately
focus their gaze on these events, and show similar heart rate
deceleration and ERP signatures to those of adults. Indeed,
this is the basis for the habituation technique that is our principal
source of information about infant’s minds. However, infants
develop endogenous attention much later, and it is still develop-
ing during the preschool years. Moreover, and probably corre-
lated with this fact, infants and young children appear to have
less focused attention than older children – for example, they
show better incidental memory.
The neurology suggests a similar picture. The parietal and sensory
systems involved in exogenous attention are on line at an early age.
The top-down frontal regions and connections that control
endogenous attention only mature later. Young animals’ brains are
far more plastic than adult brains and this plasticity is much less
focused and attention-dependent. Cholinergic transmitters are in
place early, while inhibitory transmitters emerge only later.
So again, an undoubtedly oversimplified but suggestive picture
emerges. When infants and young children process information
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